The second round of the World Bank’s Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey (AWMS), released on November 22 and covering the period June to August 2022, included 5,800 Afghan households who responded to telephone interviews. Contains a representative sample of the main. Despite its challenges and gaps, the AWMS provides the best available data on households in Afghanistan today. The study reveals that Afghans continue to suffer from low incomes, widespread hunger, health problems, and widespread poverty. The country is facing another harsh winter and the future outlook remains bleak.
The perfect storm of widespread poverty and food insecurity continues
One-third of all households surveyed do not have enough income to buy the food they need, and nearly another third have enough to buy food but lack other basic needs. There are no essentials. This represents a very small decline compared to the first round of AWMS, which covered October-November 2021, but the latest survey shows that food and income tend to be more abundant in the post-harvest period. Since it covers a period of time, there is nothing positive about the current situation and trends. .
Loss of income due to economic collapse following the Taliban takeover in August 2021 has been the main cause of worsening food insecurity, which has been exacerbated by successive drought-induced crop failures. Wheat production for the 2021-22 season is expected to be 5% lower than last year’s drought-affected production and about 15% lower than the average of the past five years.
Similar to the first round of AWMS, household coping mechanisms include purchasing cheaper, lower quality food. Borrow money to buy food. Then, ration by reducing portion sizes, reducing adult food intake for children, and reducing the number of meals per day. All of these coping strategies except the last one were reported to be used by the majority of households surveyed. Although not included in the AWMS, more extreme and harmful coping mechanisms have been reported in certain cases, such as families forced to marry their daughters to obtain bride price to make ends meet.
Awareness of better security and precarious low-level economic equilibrium
The perception that security has improved significantly constitutes perhaps the only significant “peace dividend” to come from the end of the Taliban takeover and large-scale fighting across the country. More than two-thirds of those surveyed feel much safer, or at least somewhat safer, than they did in the months before the Taliban takeover, compared to just 4 people who feel less safe. It was less than one-fold.
Improvements in security have been most pronounced in regions where the most fighting occurred last year, and are still significant, although less so, in central regions and urban areas. The lowest percentage of households feeling safe was in the West-Central region (which includes the majority of the country’s Hazara minority) and the Central Region (which is dominated by Kabul) at 46% and 56%, respectively. Ta.
Thanks in part to improvements in security, Afghanistan’s economy no longer appears to be in free fall, but rather in a precarious low-level equilibrium. Recent modest positive trends include lower inflation (though still in double digits), stable exchange rates (about 87-89 Afghani to the US dollar), some recovery in imports, and exports more than doubling. This includes stable or slightly increasing demand. Labor, wages, and Taliban revenue collections are above levels seen in the past two years. However, this degree of economic stability is largely dependent on the continued flow of humanitarian aid, including cash transfers by the United Nations totaling $1.8 billion in the past year, whose suspension could precipitate a humanitarian catastrophe. There is sex. Even with this aid, most Afghans remain poor and hungry, or in “starvation equilibrium.”
Moreover, improved safety does not translate into economic optimism. 65% of those interviewed thought their household’s financial situation would be even worse in 12 months’ time, and this was 3% of those who thought there would be some improvement. It’s almost double. These numbers represent a sharp deterioration from before last year’s Taliban takeover, and slightly worse than immediately after the Taliban’s victory.
Adapting to adversity: education and labor force participation
In the fields of education and work, the numbers speak to the tragedy and adaptation of humanity in the face of severe social restrictions and economic collapse. Faced with severe economic hardship and a ban on girls’ secondary education, Afghan families have responded by increasing the labor force participation of adults as well as young people, most of whom are self-employed or engaged in household activities. are doing.
Nevertheless, the strong underlying interest in education in Afghan society is surprising. In this sample, primary school attendance has increased for both boys and girls since 2020 (more in rural than urban areas), reflecting recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and likely improving It is thought that this has been done. safety. And in rural areas, despite the economic crisis faced by families and the Taliban’s restrictions, the enrollment rate of girls in secondary school has remained unchanged, albeit at a low level of approximately 15% on a seasonally adjusted basis, and is currently being addressed. This is slightly higher than the number of female students who do so. Urban area. The percentage of households that do not send girls to school is high at 46%, but has declined since the takeover of the Taliban regime due to an increase in elementary school attendance in rural areas, perhaps reflecting the perception that local security has improved. This seems to be reflected.
Unfortunately, the Afghan people’s desire for their children to be educated has led to the closure of girls’ secondary schools and other social restrictions, which have significantly reduced girls’ secondary education attendance, especially in urban areas. denied due to economic problems.
Participation in the labor force in Afghanistan has increased significantly overall, with women and girls in particular participating primarily in informal activities at home, likely due to economic necessity and schooling opportunities. This is thought to reflect a combination of a decrease in Women’s labor force participation rate rose to 45% from 16% in 2019-20. Women’s unemployment (i.e., women and girls who report looking for work but not finding it) also increased, due to the increase in labor force participation (including salaried employment, self-employment, and those in the labor force). It was only a fraction of the time. profitable economic activity at home, and people looking for work but not finding it).
The panel data shows that it must be a major “defection” and a traumatic whiplash for Afghan women. Almost half of employed women lost their jobs in 2019-2020, becoming unemployed or leaving the labor force, while two-thirds of female teachers remained in their jobs. On the other hand, more than half of inactive women in 2020 were in the labor force, and the majority were engaged in home-based activities (e.g., agriculture, livestock, textiles, handicrafts).
The increase in female labor force participation appears to be primarily driven by the dire economic conditions facing households. The collapse of girls’ secondary education in urban areas, and the shift in the composition of women participating in economic activities away from paid employment and outside employment, toward home-based activities, and if these trends continue, Afghanistan’s This will cause significant damage to long-term economic development. This trend will continue for much longer, and the number of boys attending secondary schools will also decline, especially in urban areas. More boys are dropping out of secondary school in search of work, and more boys are working while still in school.
An increase in male labor force participation (from 75% to 83% in 2019-20) is associated with a commensurate increase in unemployment (from 6% to 14%). There has been no net increase in the proportion of men who are gainfully employed, as more men are looking for work but are unable to find it.
Main meaning
Afghans appear to have adapted as best as they can to dire conditions, but this does not alleviate widespread poverty, hunger, and deprivation. Some of their coping mechanisms may make the situation worse in the long run. Reducing the quantity and quality of household food consumption has negative effects on health and nutrition. Higher labor force participation among young people will reduce educational attainment and worsen the situation in the long run.
In the long term, there is no alternative to sustained economic recovery and growth led by the private sector and including public investment in infrastructure and other public goods. However, in the short term, Afghanistan will need continued humanitarian assistance to survive the upcoming winter and subsequent low season, after which humanitarian needs are unlikely to decline sharply. This highlights the urgent importance of not only sustaining humanitarian aid, but also improving its effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
Increasing the use of cash transfers to provide aid (potentially including digital currencies) is a promising approach. This is because (1) such remittances are used for food and basic needs, as shown in household budget surveys, and (2) the overhead costs of aid are minimized. (3) the prevalence of poverty and food insecurity in Afghanistan means that precise targeting of cash transfers is unnecessary; and (4) cash transfers inject liquidity and encourage private sector business activity and trade. To do. These benefits more than offset the risk of leakage from small cash transfers to households.
Aid programs need to support and foster such activities, especially in the short term, especially given that much of women’s employment is in home-based farming and other informal work.
While the emphasis on basic public health assistance is understandable, Afghans suffering from serious health problems (88% of households surveyed had at least one person in need of medical services in the previous month) (approximately 57 people) rely heavily on privately provided medical services. Percent of surveyed households did so. Public hospitals in urban areas and basic health facilities in rural areas remain essential, but a broader perspective is needed to encompass privately provided health services.
External labor movements and inward remittances, which have been essential safety valves for Afghans during the past four decades of conflict, drought and economic weakness, must not be cut off by neighboring countries. Although this topic is not covered in his AWMS, early research emphasizes the importance of labor mobility and remittances. Neighboring countries should be encouraged not to ban the influx of Afghans who face desperate situations in the coming winter and poor harvest season, and ensure that remittance flows into Afghanistan are supported through both the banking system and informal channels. Must be encouraged.
Finally, looking to the future of the AWMS, continued reliance on household survey frames and telephone numbers for 2019-20 and 2021, while useful for analyzing trends in the household panel itself, will take time. may become increasingly unrepresentative of Afghan realities on the ground over time. The World Bank should begin considering other options, including the possibility of reinstating face-to-face national household surveys.