Chairman, members, colleagues, and distinguished guests. I am pleased to appear before you to discuss the social structure of North Korea. I was specifically asked to talk a little about the North Korean regime’s political classification system.
My brief presentation consists of two parts. The first is the theoretical social structure of North Korea, and the second is the actual social structure.
No dictatorship can afford social and political equality for its people, but the North Korean regime is more politically stratified than most, thanks in part to the policies of its current ruler, Kim Jong-un. , has constructed a sophisticated model of discrimination and persecution. Mr. Il and his late father, Kim Il-sung, spent more than 50 years perfecting their political system.
It is not uncommon to distinguish between those who are (we believe) on our side and those who are against us. This is the basis of North Korea’s political classification system. In this case, “with us” seems to mean “with the people of North Korea in their struggle to achieve socialism.” However, as the political classification system is used by authorities, “with us” instead means “personal loyalty to Kim Jong Un and his regime.”
The following brief explanation of the Kim regime’s three-part political classification system is summarized from the book I co-authored with Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass. Similar statements can be found in the annual human rights white paper published by the Korean Institute for National Unification in Seoul.
Since the 1950s, the Kim regime has subjected its citizens to a series of political tests to weed out those presumed to be loyal or disloyal to the regime. After a three-year review period that began in 1967, then-Chairman Kim Il-sung reported at the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 1970 that the people could be divided into three political groups. He suspects a “wavering class” and a politically unreliable “hostile class.”
Individuals are further divided into 51 subcategories, such as the precarious class of people who were landowners before the communists came to power, and those who lived in the southern half of South Korea before 1945. The political history of parents, grandparents, and grandparents, as well as relatives as distant as cousins, are also determining factors in the classification process. At the time of the most recent party congress held in 1980, about 25 percent of the population was classified as a core class, 50 percent as an unstable class, and the remaining unfortunate 25 percent relegated to a hostile class. Ta.
Individuals’ political loyalties are likely to be reexamined each time they come to the attention of authorities, for example when considering work, housing or travel permits. A person’s political classification is not a matter of public knowledge, nor is it known to the individual, but it is recorded in the personal records that all North Koreans track throughout their lives, and of course is part of the records of their children and relatives. becomes. good.
Only those classified as politically loyal can hope to attain a responsible position in North Korean society. Those classified as members of the unstable class are unlikely to be considered for membership in the Korean Workers’ Party. People classified as hostile classes are discriminated against in employment, food, housing, health care, and housing.
This classification system is clearly an inefficient means of determining how committed a person is to socialism or how loyal to the Kim regime. Many motivated and talented people are in fact patriotic North Koreans, but because their official records are tainted by the historical political affiliations of their ancestors and relatives, they are not fully involved in North Korean life. I am unable to participate in the event. However, for the Kim regime, the people are largely disposable, and when it comes to ensuring the security of the regime, it seems that the regime believes that it is better to be safe than sorry.
Now that I have briefly outlined this elaborate system of political classification, I think it says a lot about the mindset of North Korean leaders and their ideals for a utopian, managed North Korean society, but despite its apparent appearance. I would like to warn you that this does not match reality.
North Korean society is full of corruption. The political history of North Korea, and the history of one’s parents, grandparents, and even distant relatives, certainly affects one’s life chances. But more important than that is money.
North Korea’s socialist economy is not functioning. Most people live in poverty. Millions of people are always hungry. Government and party officials, including some police forces and members of party organizations, who compile and use this political information, bend the rules to better the lives of themselves and their families.
I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that North Korean society is built on bribes. In a country that prides itself on not paying taxes, it has become a way of life and a universal tax. All of the necessities mentioned above, such as employment, food, medical care, housing, and shelter, can be purchased illegally. Arrest and release protection is sold as well. Bribes are useless only if your case involves the personal interests of Kim Jong Il, who has it all.
Finally, I would like to suggest what this information about political classification tells us about the social structure of North Korea. Its structure is broken. North Korea is not actually a socialist economic system. Most people rely on the underground market economy to survive. There is no rule of law. There is only money and power.
North Korean society is unstable, experiencing one crisis after another. However, people are adept at adapting to the situation, taking care of themselves and their families, and helping their neighbors and townspeople if possible.
However, because most North Koreans are unable to leave their country and no one can challenge the political system, social disorder in North Korea has largely remained subdued, with people unable to leave their country under the Kim regime. Until they realize there are political alternatives to their livelihoods, they will continue to be suppressed.
*The views expressed in this testimony do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for Defense Analyses or its clients.